
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Security Target
Exceptions to
Shall/Shall Not
Statement(s)
5.7.2.2 ECC MQV
Associate Value
Function
5.7.2.3 Elliptic Curve
Cryptography MQV
(ECC MQV) Primitive
5.7.2.3.1 Full MQV
Form of the ECC MQV
Primitive
5.7.2.3.2 One-Pass
Form of the ECC MQV
Primitive
5.8 Key Derivation
Functions for Key
Agreement Schemes
In TLS the MAC key
is used for traffic
protection as well as
key confirmation.
Only applicable if Key
Confirmation (KC) or
implementation validation
testing are to be
performed as specified in
Section 8.
5.8.1 Concatenation
Key Derivation
Function (Approved
Alternative 1)
Only applicable if If Key
Confirmation (KC) or
implementation validation
testing are to be
performed as specified in
Section 8.
5.8.2 ASN.1 Key
Derivation Function
(Approved Alternative
2)
Only applicable if If Key
Confirmation (KC) or
implementation validation
testing are to be
performed as specified in
Section 8.
6.1 Schemes Using
Two Ephemeral Key
Pairs, C(2)
6.1.1 Each Party Has a
Static Key Pair and
Generates an Ephemeral
Key Pair, C(2, 2)
6.1.1.1 dhHybrid1,
C(2, 2, FFC DH)
6.1.1.2 Full Unified
Model, C(2, 2, ECC
CDH)
TOE does not use ECC.
TOE would use C(2,0)
6.1.1.3 MQV2, C(2, 2,
FFC MQV)
6.1.1.4 Full MQV, C(2,
2, ECC MQV)
TOE does not use ECC.
TOE would use C(2,0)
6.1.1.5 Rationale for
Choosing a C(2, 2)
Scheme
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