Cisco IPS4345 Bedienungsanleitung Seite 47

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Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Security Target
TOE SFRs
How the SFR is Satisfied
tests will cause the device to shut down and restart the POST. The cryptographic
self tests include Known Answer Testing (KAT) to verify that, given known inputs,
the correct results are produced by the cryptographic modules.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
An administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local
and remote administrative sessions. When a session is inactive (i.e., no session
input from the administrator) for the configured period of time the TOE will
terminate the session requiring the administrator to log in (be successfully identified
and authenticated) again to establish a new session.
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.4
Administrators are able to exit out (logout) of both local and remote administrative
sessions, terminating the authenticated session.
FTA_TAB.1
The TOE displays a banner at time of logon via the CLI and GUI. Administrators
can customize the banner text.
FTP_ITC.1
When configured by an Administrator to dynamically modify access control lists on
compatible network traffic blocking and rate-limiting devices such as routers,
switches, and firewalls, the TOE supports initiation of SSH connections to those
network devices. The TOE supports remote retrieval of audit records (event logs)
over TLS/HTTPS connections initiated to the TOE from authorized and
authenticated remote systems. The TOE can initiate connections over SCP (SSH),
or TLS/HTTPS to copy iplogs (logs of IPS events, not “event logs”) to remote
systems. The TOE can initiate SCP (SSH) or TLS/HTTPS connections to download
IPS signature file updates or other files.
FTP_TRP.1
All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSH
or TLS/HTTPS session initiated by remote administrators. The SSH sessions and
TLS sessions are secured using AES encryption and SHA hashing.
6.3 TOE Bypass and interference/logical tampering Protection Measures
The TOE consists of a hardware platform in which all operations in the TOE scope are protected
from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. All administration and configuration
operations are performed within the physical boundary of the TOE. Also, all TSP enforcement
functions must be invoked and succeed prior to functions within the TSC proceeding.
The TOE has been designed so that all locally maintained TSF data can only be manipulated via
the secured management interface, a CLI interface. There are no undocumented interfaces for
managing the product.
All sub-components included in the TOE rely on the main chassis for power, memory
management, and access control. In order to access any portion of the TOE, the Identification &
Authentication mechanisms of the TOE must be invoked and succeed.
No processes outside of the TOE are allowed direct access to any TOE memory. The TOE only
accepts traffic through legitimate TOE interfaces. Specifically, processes outside the TOE are not
able to execute code on the TOE. None of these interfaces provide any access to internal TOE
resources.
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